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SurveyThe existence of primary pneumonic plague outbreaks raises concerns over the use of the causative bacteria as
an aerosol-based bioweapon. We employed an individual-based model, parameterised using published
personal contact information, to assess the severity of a deliberate release in a discrete community, under the
inﬂuence of two proposed intervention strategies. We observed that the severity of the resulting epidemic is
determined by the degree of personal compliance with said strategies, implying that prior preparedness
activities are essential in order that public awareness and willingness to seek treatment is achieved quickly.l rights reserved.© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.Background
The bacterium Yersinia pestis can cause four different disease
manifestations in human hosts. The most common and well known is
bubonic plague arising from the agent passing into a host via a ﬂea
bite. Septiceamic and secondary pneumonic plague are complications
arising from bubonic plague when the infection reaches the blood
and lungs respectively. Primary pneumonic plague (PP) occurs when
Y. pestis is directly inhaled, either directly from person to person
through the passage of respiratory droplets (Begier et al., 2006) or
potentially from deliberate aerosol release. In the absence of
appropriate treatment the case fatality rate for PP approaches 100%
(Wu, 1926). The endemicity of plague infections in certain countries,
and indeed the increasing number of reported cases throughout the
1980s and 90s, as collated by the World Health Organization (2000),
evoke concern over its potential use as a biological weapon, with
deliberate aerosol release considered to be a possible avenue for
terrorist attack (Inglesby et al., 2000a).
Mathematical models of the transmission of disease within
populations help to inform the evidence base for policy makers
seeking to determine the effectiveness of speciﬁc strategies intended
tomitigate the impact of such a release. The aim of this study has been
to examine the consequences of non-optimal individual compliance
with speciﬁc intervention strategies in the case of a PP outbreak, using
an individual-based model. We used available epidemiological data,demographic data and incorporated behavioural intentions from a
recent questionnaire-based survey (Rubin et al., 2010) to investigate
what effect population behaviours might have on the ability of public
health professionals to best mitigate the impact of a deliberate release
of Y. pestis. The use of an individual-based approach allows the
attribution of speciﬁc behaviour to individuals, incorporating explicit
statements of assumption and identiﬁcation of knowledge gaps
that can be challenging to capture in compartmental type models
(for example Anderson and May (1992), Levin and Durrett (1996),
Rahmandad and Sterman (2008)).
Mathematical models of infectious disease outbreaks typically
assume a particular public response to a speciﬁed intervention and
then perform sensitivity analysis around that assumption (for
example Hall et al. (2007)). Some authors have addressed this
uncertainty (for further examples see the recent review article Funk
et al. (2010) and references therein), often though there is little
evidence base to make informed judgement about such matters, and
so where in parameter space one should focus attention in order to
provide baseline scenarios is unclear. The employed survey results
reveal the reaction of a sample of individuals to a series of
hypothetical circumstances concerning the progressive realisation of
an outbreak of PP. Although intended behaviour does not necessarily
manifest itself into actual observable behaviour (Webb and Sheeran,
2006), the intuition of personal planning is better than simple
parameter assumptions.
Twomethods of mitigating such an outbreak were considered; the
Mass Treatment Centre, and Home Isolation. In the case of the latter
strategy, individuals were requested to remain at home for a period of
time, during which they were provided with a supply of antibiotics.
Table 1
Range of disease parameters chosen in model.
Parameter Value Source
Timestep 1 h Fixed
Number of families 25,000 Assumed
Average family size 3.5 people POLYMOD
Maximum family size 6 people POLYMOD
Minimum family Size 1 person POLYMOD
Work/school days Monday to Friday Assumed
Average work day length 10 hours Assumed
Average work place size 7 people POLYMOD
Average school day length 8 h Assumed
Average school class size 7 people POLYMOD
Length of social visits 6 h Assumed
Average social group size 6 people POLYMOD
Social mixing events per week 4 Assumed, allocated randomly
R0 3.5 Nishiura et al. (2006)
Untreated case fatality ratio 1.00 Gani and Leach (2004)
Initial seed 500 people Rubin et al. (2010)
Latent period μ (lognormal) 1.35 Gani and Leach (2004)
Latent period σ (lognormal) 0.38 Gani and Leach (2004)
Infectious period μ (lognormal) 0.83 Gani and Leach (2004)
Infectiousperiodσ (lognormal) 0.45 Gani and Leach (2004)
Antibacterial protection 7 days Health ProtectionAgency (2010a)
Background ILI 0.0003 HealthProtectionAgency(2010b)
Treatment duration at MTC 4 h Assumed
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relevant individuals were encouraged to visit, whereupon they were
again supplied with antibiotics.
Methods
A discrete time simulation environment is employed to model a
virtual town that suffers from a bioterrorist attack of pneumonic
plague. Within the town each individual is allocated a home and a
workplace (or school) and a social contact network. This town is
organised to provide the number of contacts within households, social
settings and workplaces (schools) as suggested by the POLYMOD
survey (Mossong et al., 2008). For simplicity no transmission events
were assumed to occur during travel, except within existing social/
work/household groups. The age of an individual is important in
terms of their contacts made during mixing at the three attributed
locations but given the timescale of an outbreak, and the seriousness
of the disease on health outcome irrespective of age, the effects on an
individual of ageing is ignored and so individuals are assigned an ‘age’
of adult or child.
Disease progression in humans
The epidemiological progress of an untreated individual with PP is
simulated using categories susceptible, latent, infectious and dead. The
individuals progress through the categories in a manner as shown in
Fig. 1, during which time they may choose, or be chosen to receive
treatment. Should this intervention be successful, that person then
enters the resistant category for a period of time, during which they
are considered neither susceptible nor infectious. Should intervention
fail they are removed from further interaction and enter the dead
category.
For latent and infectious periods we used ﬁtted lognormal
distributions with means of approximately 4.3 and 2.5 days respec-
tively, after Gani and Leach (2004) (see Table 1). The resistant period,
during which time the individual is receiving antibacterial treatment
is considered to be 7 days (Table 1), a timescale which ordinarily
allows for the average infection to run its course and is supported by
medical consensus (Health Protection Agency, 2010a).
Population
Data collected under the POLYMOD project (Mossong et al., 2008)
includes the mean household size for the U.K. sample, plus both the
total number and proportion by location of contacts made by an
individual per day, sorted by age. The size of work (school) and social
mixing groups were set such that model output would simulate the
POLYMOD daily contact summary data (taking the mean over the ageFig. 1. Epidemiological comgroups summarised and considering only the three most common
contact locations of home, school/work, and social peer groups). Once
randomly allocated to a contact group at a location those individuals
within are permanently embedded in that group.
A modelled neighbourhood then consists of households, each one
containing a number of individuals. These individuals mix during the
‘nighttimes’ in their household groups. The individuals then travel to
work (school) in the mornings and mix in these locations until the
working (school) day has elapsed. The working day is taken as a
typical 8 hour length (6 hours for school) but is extended to allow for
additional mixing with ofﬁce/class mates (see Table 1). At weekends
individuals do not travel to work (school). At the end of the working
day or at weekends individuals may assemble in social groups, and
randomly make 4 social meetings per week. Mixing within each of
these constructed groups is then homogenous.
In each simulation we modelled a total of 25,000 households. Each
householdwas populated from a sample of a Poisson distributionwith
a mean of 3.5 persons (Mossong et al., 2008), with values beyond the
bounds of 1 and 6 rejected. This results in a total population of about
90,000 people, sufﬁciently large to resemble that of a town or
population served by a commuter hub. We do not attempt to model a
particular ‘real’ town or commuter hub but maintain a virtual generic
community based about the average contact information gathered
during the POLYMOD project. As such households, workplaces andpartment ﬂowchart.
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physical location has no bearing on the infection process.
As the population of a household or workplace diminishes due to
ongoing treatment/isolation of cases or fatalities we assume that the
number of contacts between people in the given local community
decreases accordingly (i.e. if a contactors intended contact is removed
from the local population the contactor continues without seeking an
alternative contact and so the underlying network of contact in that
location is unchanged at that time). We term this assumption Type 1
mixing. This assumption may model circumstances within a typical
workplace, in which an ofﬁce does not become more tightly
connected as its population diminishes.
We did not explicitly model hospitals in order to more clearly
assess the impact of the community-based public health interven-
tions. Although we appreciate that hospitals might suffer nosocomial
outbreaks or ﬁnd early severe cases referred to them for treatment,
such events are difﬁcult to quantify or predict.
Infection process
The transmission potential of disease from individual to individual
depends on the infectiousness of the infector, the susceptibility of the
infectee, the physical mobility of both individuals and behavioural
responses of both individuals to the infection.
In order for the successful transmission of PP, two individuals must
be in close contact, considered to be sufﬁciently close for respiratory
infection to occur (Inglesby et al., 2000b), subject to both the infectivity
of the disease and the progress of the infection within the carrier. The
POLYMOD data supplies details of both physical and non-physical
contacts and, given that the infection appears not to be easily
transmittable from person to person (Kool (2005), Ratsitorahina et al.
(2000)), only physical contacts were assumed capable of passing on the
disease as proxy for close contact.
Typically, models appeal to the concept of the Basic Reproduction
Number, R0, which represents the average number of secondary
infections caused by an individual during the course of their infectious
period in awholly susceptible population (Anderson andMay, 1992).R0
is a threshold ﬁgure suggesting whether an infection will cause an
epidemic or fade out. Estimates of the Basic ReproductionNumber for PP
range from 1.3 (Gani and Leach, 2004) to as high as 3.5 (Nishiura et al.,
2006). The latter estimate takes into account the effect of time
inhomogeneity in a number of sample epidemics, with the calculated
R0 peaking at time t=0 and decaying as the infection progresses. Many
infections were made in home or hospital settings (Gani and Leach,
2004), showing the likely close contact required for transmission and
the secondary attack rates suffered by caregivers at least early in an
outbreak before barriers are put in place. This also highlights another
important issue; that in a household setting when an infectious case is
not ambulatory, the depletion of potential susceptible people they may
make contact with is rapid, thus self-limiting the outbreak.
Indeed, this household structured model, with a large number of
strongly interacting accumulations of individuals, weakly
interconnected, potentially facilitates such barriers to disease trans-
mission. In addition, the high fatality rate of PP, coupled with the
proportionately small household size potentially distances the
scenario further from that of a global, homogeneously mixed
populace. This means that estimates of transmissibility from historical
outbreaks may not be directly transferable as the population mixing
will vary by time, geographical location and socio-economic and
cultural status. Indeed the estimates of R0 above implicitly accom-
modate many factors that our model makes explicit.
Further complicating this issue is the fact that infectivity is not
constant throughout the course of the infectious period. Evidence
suggests that transmission primarily occurs during the latter stages of
the disease (Wu (1926), Kool (2005)), likely due to the increasingly
productive nature of the symptoms and quantity of Y. pestis bacilli inthe lungs (Begier et al. (2006), Kool (2005), Tieh et al. (1948)). Attempts
to determine transmission frequency as a function of disease age
(Nishiura, 2008)donot, understandably, distinguish inherent infectivity
from factors such as contact frequency and proximity. Therefore, our
solutionwas tomodel thevariation of inherent transmissionpotential of
infectious cases to those susceptible individuals that happen to be
within range of respiratory droplets as a composite function, initially
remaining low for the ﬁrst day before rising rapidly to peak during the
last day. We choose for convenience to model this transmission
potential such that T(ta)=exp(3π(2ta−1)/2)/2 provided that tab ti/2,
and T(ta)=1−exp(−3π(2ta−1)/2)/2 otherwise, where ta is the
amount of time spent infectious by a case so far, and ti is the length of
that individuals infectiousperiod.As a corollary of the symptomseverity
we established the concept of personal mobility; i.e. the probability that
a symptomatic individual will be ﬁt enough to interact externally to
their local household, as being 1−T(ta).
Within a model realisation we allowed a potential average number
of secondary infections over the course of an infection period to be 3.5,
which is equivalent to the upper estimate from outbreak data, in order
to increase the likelihood of an ongoing epidemic prior to interven-
tions. However, because the mobility and infectivity assumptions in
the model, the household based nature of infection and the number of
observed household contacts/sizes from POLYMOD the actual number
of secondary cases arising from each initial case is less than this value
(see Fig. 2).
The transmission process is modelled as follows. During each
hourly time-step, each cell containing one or more infectious
individuals and one or more susceptible individuals is considered.
For each infectious individual in the cell the number of infections
caused is calculated by sampling from a binomial distribution, with
the number of trials being the number of susceptible people in the
group (noting that groups are based on expected number of contacts
in given locations) and probability of success given by the transmis-
sion potential of the case. For each transmission event, a random
individual from within the local group is chosen to be the recipient.
Should this individual be susceptible to infection, the transmission
event is considered successful and both parties are recorded in the
stored transmission network as source and recipient (should the
chosen individual be of any other status, the event is ignored).
Without intervention this process continues until the disease has
been naturally extinguished.
Commensurate with the survey scenario (Rubin et al., 2010)
describing the source of the epidemic being located at a commuter
hub, 500 individuals were infected at random. More complex
assignment and distribution of cases (as a proxy for the advection–
diffusion process that might transport material over a real town) had
no bearing on eventual outcomes.
Interventions
Two separate intervention scenarios are considered that may be
triggered after a certain number of fatalities have been reported,
summarised in Table 1. Mass Treatment Centres (MTC) are facilities
where individuals may travel to in order to seek treatment. Whilst
there they are examined, provided with antibiotics, and released; a
period designated as an arbitrary four hours. This process requires
physical travel by each individual, and is thus more likely to be
frequented by those in the pre-symptomatic or early symptomatic
stages of the disease when their capacity for locomotion is not
signiﬁcantly impeded. We do not consider the possibility that an
incapacitated individual might potentially designate a mobile friend
or family member to travel to the MTC to obtain antibiotics on their
behalf as treatment and counselling are critical components of the
intervention. If a person is sufﬁciently immobile as to be unable to
travel the disease is considered too far advanced for therapy to be of
any signiﬁcant effect. Whilst at the Mass Treatment Centre the
Fig. 2.Mean daily replacement number and infectious numbers for (i) a typical structured
modelwith amean household size of 3.5, and, (ii) a homogenously interacting populace of
equivalent size.
Table 2
Range of parameters chosen for Mass Treatment Centre intervention strategy.
Parameter Survey response Additional value(s)
Mc 0.1% 0.5% 2.5%
MR 75.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Mi 29.0% 0.0% 58.0%
Ms 18.0%
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This process is a simpliﬁcation of the logistic issues that might affect a
real world MTC. However, it achieves the intended goal of being a
remotely located medical facility of limited capacity.
Home Isolation (HI) requires that the individual remain at home for
a certain period of time, during which they are again supplied with
antibiotics. Due to the potential of transmission to other members of
the household, strict isolation procedures are maintained. It has been
shown that simple masks are sufﬁcient to block the inhalation of
infectious droplets (Kool (2005), Inglesby et al. (2000a), Wu (1926),
Chernin (1989)) and thus prevent the transmission of the disease.
In each scenario we were interested in two primary results con-
cerning intervention effectiveness. Firstly, overall fatality as a function
of rapidity of response (encompassed in the trigger value, T, the
cumulativenumber of dead required for outbreak awareness), secondly,
though of greater relevance to the aimof the initial survey, is the relative
fatality with respect to individual compliance with interventions.
Individual behavioural response to interventions
In the case of the Mass Treatment Centre, the pertinent individual
compliance parameters are, ﬁrstly,MR, the fraction of those who have
passed through the railway station in question (referred to as the
release zone) who state that they would visit the MTC as soon as
possible if asked to, in preference to alternate options such as visiting
their general practitioner or a local hospital. The choice of value forMR
was predicated by the survey compliance of 75%, with bounding
values intended to examine the consequences of increased or reduced
compliance with this intervention.
Secondly, Mi represents the fraction of individuals not within the
release zone but expressing ﬂu-like symptoms who said they wouldvisit the MTC as soon as possible. Bearing in mind the similarity in
symptoms between inﬂuenza and PP, at least in the earlier
symptomatic stages of the disease, one must consider whether in
this contextMi is chosen to represent the victims of any ﬂu-like illness
or only those suffering from plague. Given the extreme severity of PP,
it must be assumed that the possibility of a nascent epidemicwould be
sufﬁcient to trigger a presumptive diagnosis of the disease in a
potential case unless there was conclusive proof otherwise. In
combination with the low baseline prevalence of inﬂuenza-like-
illness (30 GP consultations per 100,000 population (Health Protec-
tion Agency, 2010b)), we determined that Mi should represent only
those suffering from PP. Mi was speciﬁed as 29% of individuals
choosing the Mass Treatment Centre as the immediate source of
information, with an upper bound of double this value.
Finally,Ms is the fraction of the susceptible population, not within
the release zone, who would visit the MTC anyway, despite
instructions to the contrary, the survey suggests that 18% of the
local population might attempt this behaviour.
In addition to the above factors parameterised by survey
responses, we have deﬁned the value Mc, the Mass Treatment Centre
capacity, or fraction of the total population who may be treated
simultaneously. We assumed a selection of values for the purpose of
sensitivity analysis (see Table 2).
Home Isolation utilizes a smaller range of parameters, reﬂecting
the fact that external factors play a more limited role in the success of
this strategy. The two integral parameters, MR and Mi, possess
deﬁnitions analogous to their MTC counterparts, with values shown
in Table 3.
For MR, 70% of survey respondents indicated that they would be
very likely to remain at home for 7 days, with an additional 22% being
fairly likely. In addition to these values we also investigated the results
of full and zero compliance. Mi, was not elicited in the survey in this
context and so we assumed an identical compliance fraction to the
former strategy, with wide bounds in order to investigate the
sensitivity of this factor.
For each of these two strategies, we allowed the model to march
the epidemic forward until the trigger value, T was met. At this point
the chosen intervention strategy was initiated and the model allowed
to continue until the epidemic had been extinguished. Each set of
parameters was repeated for a series of 100 (MTC) or 25 (HI)
realisations, sufﬁcient to account for structural and stochastic
variability, whilst reducing computational burden.Results
Model validation
Model structure
To test the consequences of using R0 as an input value for
individual transmission potential in the context of a structuredmodel,
we created two scenarios in which there are no interventions in place.
Firstly, that of the POLYMOD-supported population described earlier,
and secondly an equivalently sized community with no household
structure or external community travel. This latter simulation is as
close as is feasible to that of a single, isolated metapopulation in a
standard mass-action model.
Table 3
Range of parameters chosen for Home Isolation intervention strategy.
Parameter Survey Response Additional Value(s)
MR 70.0% 92.0% 0.0% 100%
Mi 0.0% 29.0% 50.0%
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scenarios, along with the mean daily replacement number, i.e. the
number of secondary infections caused during an individual's infectious
period, an identical deﬁnition to the basic reproduction number, R0, but
referring to observed model output rather than input. We see a quite
striking contrast between the two sets of results. In Fig. 2(i) we see a
growth in infectiousnumbers that is effectively linear, and a slowdecay in
replacement number from an initial peak somewhat below 2. Attack rate
is approximately 38%, as theory (MaandEarn, 2006)predicts for adisease
with an R0 value close to 1. Fig. 2(ii) demonstrates a close approximation
of the classic exponential growth and decay observed in an SEIR model,
with replacement number approaching R0 in the early stages of the
outbreak, dropping below a sustainable value of 1.0 as the epidemic
peaks. This result illustrates a single stochastic simulation of an outbreak
and as can be seen in the ﬁgure, the replacement number early in the
simulated outbreak is randomly below 3.5 and so the attack rate of 93% is
approximately equal to the expected theoretical attack rate if R0=2.85.
In intuitively explaining this departure, we would expect that an
infected individual conﬁned through sickness in a household
averaging 3.5 persons in size would be unable to achieve a high
number of secondary infections, simply due to the lack of available
susceptibles. Moreover, any secondary infections caused would be
further limited in transmission potential. Table 4 demonstrates the
dominance of transmission events occurring within the household in
the POLYMOD structured model, implying that despite the reduction
of available susceptibles, the lack of mobility of the infectious cases
limits external contact. Whilst broadly reﬂecting the proportion of
contacts in given locations by the POLYMOD survey, these modelled
results suggest that more infections occur in the home than might be
expected from the proportion of contacts.
A studyof observed transmissionevents by location (Gani andLeach,
2004) reveals the household to be the favoured location, althoughnot as
strongly as in our results. This observeddata is aggregated frommultiple
sources in a number of different countries over the last hundred years,
many of which may have substantially different household sizes and
contact patterns, but does lendweight to the above proposal, especially
as we are not modelling nosocomial transmission.
Population interaction
As an alternative to theType 1mixing assumed abovewe consider an
alternate assumption that as people are removed froma local population
unit the mixing of those remaining increases accordingly and term this
Type 2. This may be amore appropriate simulation of a family structure,
in which a greater focus of care is applied to a sick member. Given the
radically dissimilar social environments of a typical household and
workplace, it was deemed to be appropriate to consider a situation in
which the default Type 1 mixing assumption is applied to contacts
within community locations, and the Type 2 form within households.
Fig. 2 implies a potential variation in attack rate with household
size. Intuitively, individuals spend a proportion of their time in weaklyTable 4
Proportion of infections occurring in given mixing environments.




Social 8.5interconnected households of limited size, thus conﬁning the ability
of a disease in a highly infected region to migrate to a more highly
susceptible one. The smaller the size of the constituent households
within a given population a greater number of inter-household
transmission events are required to achieve similar attack rates in the
overall population, whereas if the inter-household connections are
the same as household sizes are reduced, then the global attack rate
must fall.
The smaller the households for a given population size, the greater
number of inter-household transmission events we infer must occur
in order to achieve a similar attack rate, and thus the lower the ﬁnal
attack rate for a similar level of connectivity.
To test this assumption we examined the resulting attack rate in
equivalently sized communities, arbitrarily chosen as 10,000, for a
range of household sizes. In Fig. 3 we see that attack rate increasesFig. 3. Variation in global attack rate with R0 for combinations of mixing assumptions
(Dotted line: Type 1 mixing in household, Type 1 mixing in community; Small dashed
line: Type 2 mixing in household, Type 1 mixing in community; Dashed line: Type 1
mixing in household, Type 2 mixing in community; Solid line: Type 2 mixing in
household, Type 2 mixing in community). Household size: (i) 3.5 (ii) 10 (iii) 50.
Fig. 4.Mass Treatment Centre. Variation in attack rate with trigger threshold, T, and relative attack rate with exposed compliance,MR, whereMi=0.29. (i)Mc=0.001 (ii)Mc=0.005
(iii) Mc=0.025.
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be interpreted as intermediate stages between the two extremes of
structure as observed in Fig. 2. Once the disease invades a particular
household it is able to spread without further barriers.
Fig. 3 also displays a comparison of the two forms of mixing we
have introduced. It is evident that the Type 2mixingmethod results in
considerably elevated attack rates over the Type 1 form as might be
expected. Composite methods for household and community loca-
tions show intermediate results, with the signiﬁcance of the
household mixing method dominating as household size increases.
Ultimately, we see that social behaviours driving contact are as
important as disease transmissibility of a host when assessing the
uncertainty about the impact of a potential outbreak in a community,
and the method of mixing used must be considered in the context of a
reasonable worst case. However, without evidence as to the
signiﬁcance of household care within a modern community in the
event of what might be a widely publicised and serious outbreak, we
may only consider it a potential avenue for future research, and thus




Fig. 4 represents the variation in global attack rate with release
zone compliance fraction, MR, for each of the chosen mass treatment
centre capacities, Mc. Apparent from these results is the conclusionFig. 5.Mass Treatment Centre. Variation in attack rate with trigger threshold, T, and relative a
(iii) Mi=0.58.that with increased capacity comes greater level of protection. With a
sufﬁciently small institution capacity,Mc=0.001 or approximately 90
people, we see little practical advantage over the equivalent
unconstrained epidemic observed in Fig. 3(i). With increasing MTC
capacitywe note the increased intervention effectiveness with greater
release zone compliance, MR, and also with reduced trigger value, T.
The downward trend in attack rate with decreasing trigger threshold,
even when MR=0, is due to the ongoing treatment of those
individuals expressing ﬂu-like symptoms once interventions com-
mence, Mi. Also notable is the convergence of the MR plots towards
increasing trigger value, due to a decrease in surviving individuals of
this category as time passes; hence the parameterisation of MR
becomes increasingly irrelevant as T approaches inﬁnity.
Next we examined the variation of intervention effectiveness with
increasingMi, recalling that in our model ﬂu-like symptoms represent
the existence of PP rather than inﬂuenza. For this we choose the MTC
capacity of Mc=0.005, which is sufﬁciently high to allow for
signiﬁcant intervention effectiveness, yet sufﬁciently low that the
attack rate does not approach zero at low T. Fig. 5 demonstrates the
effect of modifying Mi from the default survey-reported fraction of
0.29, ﬁrstly selecting 0.00, and secondly doubling it to 0.58. These
results demonstrate the importance of treating the infection once it
has spread beyond the initial group of exposed, and the sensitivity of
the attack rate to Mi compliance. We also conﬁrm the relation
between MR and attack rate as seen in Fig. 4, and note from the
resulting observed fatalities that a variation in Mi has greater
inﬂuence on the intervention effectiveness than an proportionallyttack rate with exposed compliance,MR, whereMc=0.005. (i)Mi=0.00 (ii)Mi=0.29
Fig. 6. Home Isolation. Variation in attack rate with trigger threshold, T, and relative attack rate with exposed compliance, MR. (i) Mi=0.00 (ii) Mi=0.29 (iii) Mi=0.50.
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members of the former category in all but the smallest plague
outbreaks.
Home isolation
Fig. 6 demonstrates the results obtained for each of the four
selected values of MR, the release zone survey response ﬁgures plus
selected extreme conditions, over a range of potential values ofMi, the
fraction of symptomatic individuals in the general population. From
this strategy we see a pattern of results corresponding to that
observed in the MTC case, with a signiﬁcantly reduced relative attack
rate with increased MR, and a somewhat greater effectiveness as a
consequence of proportionately increasing Mi. We also note the
expected increase in attack rate with larger trigger threshold.
Of note is the greater attack rate than observed in the equivalent
Mass Treatment Centre strategy when Mi=0. We deduce that this is
due to the lack of the uninfected Ms class in who, in the case of the
MTC, potentially still seek antibacterial treatment. This renders them
temporarily resistant, and thus a barrier to further disease transmis-
sion. The equivalent in the case of HI would be a class describing the
uninfected choosing to shelter in isolation at home, even when not
explicitly advised to do so, although this possibility is not considered
in the model.
Discussion
We have approached this study with the aim of examining the
consequences that behavioural choices in response to an unfolding
outbreak may have on the effectiveness of speciﬁc intervention
strategies against a deliberate aerosol release of Y. pestis bacilli.
Our model community was partly parameterised using published
data, and given our choice of disease, transmission was demonstrated
to be highly dependent on the structure of the underlying population,
even in such an abstracted and simpliﬁed population. Evidence of
transmission potential comes invariably from rural historical epizo-
otic cycles in developing countries, in which wemight naively assume
a greater mean household size than exists in a developed city. Thus,
applied to an urban setting where other socio-economic factors may
be important, we must be cautious in inferring a relation to absolute
attack rate.
What we gain from a survey such as the one uponwhich this study
is based is a psychological perspective of the pertinent population
groups and the likely outcome of their behaviour when confronted
with a proposed scenario. Thus, we may tailor our research to a
particular range of parameters in the conﬁdence that we are
demonstrating a plausible prediction of relative outbreak severity.
The survey used as evidence of intended behavioural change includeda rich source of potential responses to the emergency, including
spontaneous self-isolation and ﬂeeing the area. However, because we
wished to understand the impact on public health interventions of
behavioural choices these additional non-state sponsored responses
were excluded from our analysis.
Both intervention strategies employed show signiﬁcantly reduced
attack rate with the greater compliance fraction of both categories
targeted for treatment; those initially exposed,MR, and the secondary
and subsequent symptomatic cases within the general populace, Mi.
We also observe decreasing effectiveness with number of observed
fatalities, and therefore indirectly time elapsed, after the ﬁrst
conﬁrmed plague fatality. Additionally, given other parameters
remaining ﬁxed, as the fraction of those initially exposed that would
perform the intervention (MR) diminishes, we see a divergence when
compared to the results with ‘perfect’ compliance (MR=1), an effect
that increases as the trigger threshold decreases, and thus targeting
the exposed group becomes decreasingly effective. Of particular
interest is the fact that both categories must be targeted in order to
achieve a satisfactory efﬁcacy. It is not sufﬁcient simply to treat those
initially exposed, as by the time the disease is recognised it has
already spread beyond the initial population; likewise simply
focussing on the symptomatic cases allows for a wider early dispersal
of the infection.
We note the possibility for further development towards a more
well deﬁned concept of the Mass Treatment Centre, based upon the
conclusion that capacity exerts a strong inﬂuence upon overall
intervention effectiveness. In our model a survey response value of
18% is used to parameterize the fraction of uninfected individuals who
would present themselves for treatment, a proportion which is not
unreasonable (Rubin and Dickmann, 2010). These individuals, whilst
healthy, potentially occupy places that would otherwise be available
to treat those in the two targeted categories, MR and Mi. However,
assuming a sufﬁcient supply of antibiotics, all those healthy
individuals attending the Mass Treatment Centre would be rendered
resistant for a period of time, thus slowing and potentially halting the
spread of infection. Preliminary investigations have suggested that the
beneﬁts of this by-product do not outweigh the cost of potentially
excluding an infectious individual from treatment. Other policy issues
related to mass collection (rather than treatment) centres might not
result in timely enough delivery of countermeasures to the infected
individuals in the population.
In addition to the stated intervention strategies incorporated in the
model, we note the potential for further decentralised approaches
such as the closure of schools andworkplaces inwhich the presence of
infection has been ascertained. In order to comprehensively model an
extended epidemic it would be important to take such factors into
account; however, examination of the log of a typical ensemble of
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hundred amatter of days after the ﬁrst deaths have been reported.We
presume that this is insufﬁcient time for individual workplaces to
have implemented controls on top of those publicly available. In our
example, ﬁve hundred fatalities are reported 3 days after this stage,
and 1000 fatalities 5 days later again. Thus, results with intervention
trigger threshold values below one hundred, those demonstrating the
greatest consistent distribution in attack rate, might be expected to
remain unchanged. Notable also from POLYMOD data is the fact that,
in the United Kingdom at least, only approximately 20% of close
contacts occur within one of these community areas. The effect of
closing schools and workplaces as a strategy for containing an
epidemic may therefore not be as great as would be hoped, but
could potentially result in considerable economic cost.
We are in a position to question what effect a smaller initial
release, 10% of the presumed size, would have upon the hitherto
stated results, assuming the surveyed behaviour remains valid.
Observationally, a larger exposed population allows the disease to
spread more widely prior to interventions commencing, resulting in a
greater number of subsequent infections once the frequency of
transmission has been driven down. A similar reduction in interven-
tion effectiveness with increased trigger value exists in each scenario.
The previously noted dependence onMR is also present in the smaller
release, although to a signiﬁcantly lesser extent.
In conclusion, we have demonstrated the practicality of an
individual-based model in the study of a deliberate release of PP
bacilli, where knowledge of appropriate intended behaviour is
available. We have investigated the effectiveness of two particular
intervention strategies and concluded that human behaviour exerts a
signiﬁcant factor in epidemic severity. Ultimately, we are unable to
specify which is the better strategy due to an incomplete speciﬁcation
of the two proposals. We may simply examine the two strategies as
separate cases and state that they are both plausible solutionswithin a
certain range of parameters. The decrease in the relative number of
fatalities with increased compliance of both those initially exposed,
MR, and secondary symptomatic, Mi, suggests a public health
campaign targeting these two groups as soon as possible after the
outbreak is discovered is essential for the effective eradication of the
disease. This in turn implies a considerable level of prior organisation
to prepare for such an emergency.
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